ABSTRACT With the recent growth and commercialization of cloud computing, outsourcing computation has become one of the most important cloud services, which allows the resource-constrained clients to efficiently perform large-scale computation in a pay-per-use manner. Meanwhile, outsourcing large scale computing problems and computationally intensive applications to the cloud has become prevalent in the science and engineering computing community. As important fundamental operations, large-scale matrix multiplication computation (MMC), matrix inversion computation (MIC), and matrix determinant computation (MDC) have been frequently used. In this paper, we present three new algorithms to enable secure, verifiable, and efficient outsourcing of MMC, MIC, and MDC operations to a cloud that may be potentially malicious. The main idea behind our algorithms is a novel matrix encryption/decryption method utilizing consecutive and sparse unimodular matrix transformations. Compared to previous works, this versatile technique can be applied to many matrix operations while achieving a good balance between security and efficiency. First, the proposed algorithms provide robust confidentiality by concealing the local information of the entries in the input matrices. Besides, they also protect the statistic information of the original matrix. Moreover, these algorithms are highly efficient. Our theoretical analysis indicates that the proposed algorithms reduce the time overhead on the client side from O(n 2.3728639 ) to O(n 2 ). Finally, the extensive experimental evaluations demonstrate the practical efficiency and effectiveness of our algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
As one of the most important applications of cloud computing, outsourcing computation has attracted researchers' more and more attention and become a popular research topic recently [12] - [15] , [42] , [44] . This unprecedented and promising computing model allows clients with limited computing capability to delegate their heavy computation tasks to resource-abundant cloud servers in a pay-on-demand manner.
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However, outsourcing computation also raises several security issues. First, clients' outsourced data may contain sensitive information such as business financial records, private healthcare data, or proprietary asset data, etc. that need to be carefully protected, while the cloud servers may not be fully trusted. Due to various financial incentives, the cloud server may be lazy, curious, or even malicious. As a result, it may return a random or an artificial result to the client, steal or even deliberately leak the client's private information. Moreover, the client may receive wrong computational results due to unpredictable software and hardware faults or external attacks. Therefore, an ideal secure outsourcing algorithm is expected to meet the following requirements: (1) Correctness. With an honest cloud server, the algorithm should allow the client to obtain the actual results correctly. (2) Input/Output privacy. The algorithm should guarantee that the actual input and output of the computation task are appropriately hidden from the cloud sever, no matter it is honest or malicious. (3) Verifiability. The algorithm can ensure that the client can verify the correctness of the results returned from the cloud server with a nonnegligible probability. (4) Efficiency. The algorithm has to reduce the computation overhead of the client to an amount substantially smaller than that of executing the original computation task on his own.
Matrix, as a fundamental mathematical object, is widely used in many scientific and engineering computing fields. Many different problems can be phrased as matrix computation problems. In every branch of physics, including classical mechanics, electromagnetism, quantum mechanics, and quantum electrodynamics, matrices are used to study physical phenomena, such as the motion of rigid bodies [37] . In computer graphics, they are used to manipulate 3D models and project them onto a 2-dimensional screen. In probability theory and statistics, stochastic matrices are used to describe sets of probabilities, e.g., the PageRank algorithm denotes link relationships using matrices to rank the pages in a Google search [9] . Matrices are also used in economics to describe systems of economic relationships [45] . Moreover, in coding theory and cryptography, matrices over finite fields are used to represent codes [38] and encryption/decryption keys [1] , [30] . Therefore, the algorithms with fundamental matrix operations, such as matrix multiplication computation (MMC), matrix inversion computation (MIC) and matrix determinant computation (MDC), have become an important component of modern scientific computing.
From the complexity perspective, the MMC, MIC and MDC operations have a same time complexity of O(n 3 ) (for n by n square matrices) for the basic algorithm and O(n 2.3728639 ) for the asymptotically fastest known algorithms [26] , [36] . However, with the exponential growth in the quantity of data generated in the era of big data, the matrices to be processed in real-world problems are often very large, typically with hundreds of thousands of entries [4] , [10] , [22] . On the other hand, the proliferation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such as wearable devices, smart appliances, and smart vehicles, raise increasing needs to process and analyze local, realtime data. With limited computing resources, it is difficult for IoT devices to accomplish such large-scale matrix operations. Consequently, designing secure, verifiable, and efficient outsourcing protocols for matrix operations becomes an imperative requirement for resource-constrained clients, especially in the IoT era.
A. THE PROBLEM AND RELATED WORK
In the past few years, motivated by the extensive applications of large-scale matrices in various fields, many scholars have proposed numerous protocols to outsource different matrix operations [3] , [24] , [39] , [40] , [50] .
As one of the most fundamental matrix operations, matrix multiplication computation (MMC) outsourcing was first investigated by Atallah et al. in [3] . They initialized the study on outsourcing various matrix operations using the random permutation matrix disguise techniques. Benjamin and Atallah further proposed algorithms for secure MMC outsourcing based on an overly strong security assumption of two non-colluding servers [5] . Moreover, their protocols required performing expensive homomorphic encryption operations on the client side. Subsequently, by utilizing Shamir's secret sharing technique, Atallah and Frikken improved the aforementioned schemes and constructed an outsourcing protocol of MMC under the single malicious cloud server assumption [2] . However, in the encryption and decryption stages of their protocol, the client-side time cost is O(t 2 n 2 ). Meanwhile, the cloud server is required to conduct at least 4t + 2 matrix multiplications, where t is the threshold in Shamir's secret sharing scheme. Moreover, to achieve high verifiability, additional matrix multiplications on noise matrices are needed. All these make their protocol suffer from poor efficiency.
To efficiently delegate the heavy computation task to the cloud server, Mohassel [32] initialized the design of secure outsourcing algorithm for matrix multiplication using several existing homomorphic encryption schemes, such as Paillier [35] , BGN encryption [8] , and the GHV scheme [23] . In theory, Mohassel's algorithm reduces the complexity of client-side time cost to O(n 2 ), but it cannot achieve such efficiency in practice due to the time-consuming homomorphic encryption process. Recently, Lei et al. presented an efficient outsourcing algorithm of MMC with a concise encryption/decryption method and Monte Carlo verification [27] . The main idea is to encrypt/decrypt the matrix by multiplying a special sparse matrices (i.e. random permutation matrices). While the simplicity of permutation matrices yields a high efficiency, their algorithm suffers from some security issues, e.g. leaking the statistic information of zeros in the original matrix. Motivated by this observation, Fu et al. designed an improved algorithm to securely outsource MMC by introducing a new matrix encryption technique based on a matrix addition operation [21] . In particular, they disguised the original matrix by adding a random secret matrix. However, this technique requires carrying out small-scale matrix multiplication on the localclient side, which makes the algorithm less efficient. Furthermore, it can not be generalized to outsource other common matrix operations such as MIC and MDC. It is worthy noting that another thrust in MMC outsourcing research is designing publicly verifiable protocols [18] , [19] , [43] , [46] - [49] to allow any third party to verify the correctness of the calculation results returned from the cloud server. While it is an important issue in matrix outsourcing, it is out of the scope of our study as we focus on the two-party model in this paper.
Matrix inversion computation (MIC) is another widely applicable algebraic operation. Mohassel first investigated the secure outsourcing of MIC and proposed a secure outsourcing algorithm [32] . The algorithm encrypts the original matrix through a random matrix transformation technique (i.e. multiplying the original matrix by a random secret matrix) and invokes the outsourcing algorithm of MMC as a subroutine. As mentioned earlier, the outsourcing algorithm of MMC is based on expensive homomorphic encryption (HE) schemes. Therefore, their algorithm is subject to the low efficiency and fails to be practical in applications. In order to avoid the time-consuming HE operations, Lei et al. further put forward a new protocol [29] by directly using a similar random permutation matrix transformation technique as used in [27] . However, the algorithm also suffers from the same security problem of exposing the information of the number of zeros in the original matrix.
Similarly, secure outsourcing matrix determinant computation (MDC) has been studied recently. Following their work on securely outsourcing MMC and MIC [27] , [29] , Lei et al. designed a secure outsourcing algorithm of MDC [28] . To protect the statistic information of zeros in the original matrix, they designed a two-step encryption algorithm. The first step is to embed the n-dimensional original matrix into an (n+m)-dimensional matrix obtained by adding an n-by-m zero matrix, an m-dimensional diagonal matrix and an m-by-n random matrix B, which is the key ingredient to hide the number of zeros. In the second step, it encrypts the (n+m)-dimensional matrix via random permutations. Finally, the client delegates the lower-upper (LU) decomposition task to the cloud server. In other words, by skillfully converting the MDC operation into a high-dimensional matrix decomposition, the algorithm achieves the input/output privacy and verifiability. However, although the number of zeros in the original matrix is protected, the cloud server needs to perform a high-dimensional matrix decomposition, which increases the client's cost. Also, this technique is not feasible for outsourcing MMC and MIC.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
To better balance the efficiency and privacy of the outsourcing algorithm, e.g. to protect the statistic information of entries in original matrices without reducing the theoretical efficiency, this paper further explores the essence of sparse matrix transformation, and presents new secure outsourcing algorithms for MMC, MIC and MDC based on a novel matrix encryption/decryption method. This novel technique realizes the input/output privacy by encrypting a matrix in virtue of consecutive and sparse unimodular matrix transformations. The denseness of the product matrix of these sparse unimodular matrices ensures the security of the proposed algorithms. In other words, compared with previous works, this nice property guarantees that our algorithms not only conceal the location information of the entries in the original matrices, but also protect the statistical information of certain element, e.g. the number of zero in the original matrices.
Meanwhile, the associativity of matrix multiplication makes our algorithms efficient. Besides, our algorithms also achieve the following properties:
1) The proposed algorithms are designed under the single untrusted program model. Our algorithms only require one cloud server and one round interaction between the client and the cloud server, which avoids the overly strong security assumption of two or more non-colluding cloud servers and achieves the optimal communication overhead. 2) The proposed algorithms have robust cheating resistance. Following the Monte Carlo verification algorithm in prior work, our algorithms allow the client to verify the correctness of the results returned from the cloud server with a probability approximated to 1. 3) Our algorithms achieve decent computational savings on the local client side. In term of complexity, the proposed algorithms reduce the local-client's computational overhead from O(n 2.3728639 ) to O(n 2 ) field multiplications. Our experimental results are consistent with the theoretical analysis results. 4) The proposed matrix encryption/decryption technique can be applied in a broad range of applications. We believe that the consecutive and sparse unimodular matrix transformation technique is of independent interest. Besides the MMC, MIC and MDC operations discussed in this paper, it can be applied to outsource many other matrix operations.
C. ROAD MAP
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we present the system model and the associated security definitions in section II, and the preliminaries in section III. Our main secure outsourcing algorithms are proposed in Section IV. In section V, we prove the correctness of the proposed algorithms and analyze their security, followed by the practical efficiency analysis and performance evaluation in section VI. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY DEFINITIONS A. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig.1 , a secure outsourcing computation model generally involves two entities: a resource-constrained client and a cloud server with sufficient computational resource. The client aims to conduct some large-scale matrix operations with the assistance of the cloud server. To protect the privacy of the input data, the client first encrypts the original matrix into a large-scale ciphertext matrix using its secret key, and then sends it to the cloud server. The cloud server performs the corresponding matrix operation over the ciphertext matrix and returns the result to the client. Finally, the client verifies the correctness of the received result. If the received result is correct, the client decrypts it using the secret key to obtain the actual computational result. Otherwise, the client rejects the received result. Formally, given a computation task F, the general framework of a secure outsourcing algorithm SOA F = (SKGen, ClientEnc, CloudCom,ClientDec&Ver) consists of the following four sub-algorithms.
1) SKGen(F, 1 κ ) → {SK }: With the input of a computation task F and a security parameter κ, the secret key generating algorithm SKGen outputs a secret key SK , which should be kept private by the client. 2) ClientEnc(F, X, SK ) → {X }: Given a computation task F and the corresponding input matrix X, the encryption algorithm ClientEnc uses the secret key SK to encrypt X into a ciphertext matrix X , and sends (F, X ) to the cloud server. 3) ClientCom(F, X ) → {Z }: Receiving the computation task F and the encrypted matrix X from the client, the cloud computation algorithm CloudCom outputs Z = F(X ) and returns it to the client. 4) ClientDec&Ver(F, Z , SK ) → {Z, ⊥}: Utilizing the secret key SK and according to different computation tasks, the algorithm ClientDec&Ver first decrypts the returned result Z into Z and then verifies the correctness of Z, or the algorithm ClientDec&Ver first verifies the correctness of the returned result Z and then decrypts it into Z if Z is correct. No matter in which case, if the verification succeeds, the algorithm outputs Z, or ⊥ otherwise.
B. THREAT MODELS
According to the behaviors of the cloud, the security threats in the outsourcing computation system can be categorized into two models: the semi-honest single-server (SS) model and the malicious single-server (MS) model.
1) SEMI-HONEST SINGLE-SERVER (SS)
The SS model, also known as the ''honest but curious'' singleserver model, assumes the cloud server faithfully executes the delegated computation task and returns the actual result to the client. However, the cloud may be curious about the intermediate data and try to learn or infer the protected information.
2) MALICIOUS SINGLE-SERVER (MS)
In the MS model, the cloud server can arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed protocol, and attempt to learn sensitive information as much as it can. Worse still, it may intentionally return a random or forged result to the client. Obviously, if an outsourcing algorithm is secure under the MS model, it is still secure under the SS model. As a consequence, for some given computation tasks, designing an outsoucing algorithm under the MS model, in terms of security, is more significative than that of under the SS model.
C. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY DEFINITIONS
As introduced in Section I, a well-designed secure outsourcing algorithm should at least satisfy four requirements. We reformulate their definitions as follows.
Definition 1 Correctness: Given some computation task F, a secure outsourcing algorithm SOA F (·) is correct if the secret key generating algorithm produces SK ← SKGen(F, 1 κ ) such that, for any valid input matrix X,
Definition 2 Input/Output privacy: Given some computation task F, a secure outsourcing algorithm SOA F (·) satisfies the input (resp. output) privacy if the secret key generating algorithm produces SK ← SKGen(F, 1 κ ) such that, for any valid input matrix X, the probability that the cloud server or the adversary can recover X (resp. Z = F(X)) is negligible even if the cloud or the adversary knows the computation task F and X ← ClientEnc(F, X, SK ).
Definition 3 (1 − p)-Verifiable: Given some computation task F, a secure outsourcing algorithm SOA F (·) is (1 − p)-verifiable if the secret key generating algorithm produces SK ← SKGen(F, 1 κ ) such that, for any valid input matrix X, if X ← ClientEnc(F, X, SK ), and Z ← CloudCom(F, X ), then the probability of ClientDec& Ver(F, Z , SK ) outputting Z satisfies
the client's time overhead of performing the task on its own is t o , and the local-client's time overhead of performing the task by employing the outsourcing algorithm
SOA F (·) is t c , t o t c ≥ α.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the notations and mathematical concepts used in this work.
A. NOTATIONS AND TERMINOLOGIES
We use bold upper (resp. lower) case letters to denote matrices (resp. column vectors). M −1 , M T and det(M) denote the inversion, the transpose and the determinant of the matrix M, respectively. For convenience, some terms frequently used in this paper, such as ''matrix multiplication computation'' , ''matrix inversion computation'' and ''matrix determinant computation'', are denoted by their abbreviations ''MMC'',''MIC'' and ''MDC'', respectively. 
where q is called the order of the finite field.
A well-known property is that a finite field of order q exists if and only if the order q = p k , where p is a prime number and k is a positive integer.
Example 1: Take F q = F 7 as the finite set {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and for any x, y ∈ F 7 , define x • y = (x + y) mod 7, x y = (xy) mod 7. Then, < F 7 , •, > is a finite field of order 7.
1) < F 7 , • > is a Abelian group with addition identity 0. The additive inverses are listed as:
, > is a Abelian group with multiplication identity 1, where F * 7 = F 7 \{0} = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. The multiplicative inverses are listed as:
3) The multiplication is distributive over the addition.
C. PERMUTATION MAPPING AND PERMUTATION MATRIX
Other concepts used in this work are ''permutation mapping'' and the associated ''permutation matrix''. Both are widely used in group theory, combinatorics, coding theory and cryptography. So, we present their formal definitions and illustrate them with examples.
Definition 6 Permutation Mapping [7] : For any given finite set S = {1, 2, · · · , n}, a permutation mapping defined on S is a bijection function π : S → S, which is usually denoted as:
,
Two formalized representations of a permutation mapping are Cycle Notation and Transposition Notation. According to the parity of the number of transpositions (two-element exchanges) contained in their representations, all the permutations can be classified as even or odd. A permutation mapping is even (resp. odd) if its representation consists of an even (resp. odd) number of transpositions. For any permutation π , the sign of π is defined as:
Example 2: Let n = 3, then
is an even permutation mapping defined on the set {1, 2, 3}. Definition 7 Permutation Matrix [6] : For any given finite set S = {1, 2, · · · , n} and a permutation mapping π : S → S, the permutation matrix P π induced by π is an n × n matrix with P π (i, j) = δ π(i),j for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, where δ x,y is the Kronecker delta function defined as
It is easy to verify that the determinant of P π equals sgn(π ). Namely, det (P π ) = sgn(π ).
Example 3: Take the permutation mapping π as shown in example 2, the corresponding permutation matrix is [16] : Let A be a square matrix over a (finite) field. The PLU factorization of A refers to decomposing A into three factors − a permutation matrix P, a lower triangular matrix L and an upper triangular matrix U, that is A = PLU. Any n-by-n matrix A can be factorized in ''PLU'' form [34] . A simple property of unimodular matrix is that the inverse of a unimodular matrix is also unimodular. We list it as a lemma and omit its proof.
Definition 8 PLU Factorization
Lemma 1 [33] 
Example 4: Take U = 2 6 3 6 ∈ F 2×2 7 . Clearly, its determinant det(U) = 2 × 6 − 3 × 6 = 1 F 7 and then U is
which is obviously unimodular. Now, we prove another result about the number of unimodular matrices over F q , which will be used in the security analysis of our proposed algorithms in Section V-B.
Lemma 2: Given some finite field F q and assume that the set
There exist two cases.
(
is unique determined. Hence, the number of U in this case is (q − 1)q 2 .
(2) If u 11 = 0 F q , then u 12 u 21 = 1 F q and u 22 ∈ F q could be arbitrary. Hence, the number of U in this case is (q − 1)q.
In summary, the total number of unimodular matrices over F q with order 2 is (q − 1)q 2 + (q − 1)q = q(q − 1) (q + 1).
IV. OUTSOURCING ALGORITHMS OF MATRIX OPERATIONS A. COMPUTATION TASK DESCRIPTION AND BASIC IDEA
For any given finite field F q and two large-scale dense matrices X ∈ F n×l q , Y ∈ F l×m q , where q = p k for some prime p and integer k ≥ 1, the client intends to compute the product Z = XY, the inverse matrix X −1 (when X is an invertible square matrix) and the determinant det(X) (when X is a square matrix) by delegating the computation tasks to a public cloud server.
To protect the privacy of the input/ouput matrices, we should figure out an efficient matrix encryption/decryption method. A concise and nature way to encrypt X is multiplying X by two matrices M l and M r on both the left and right sides simultaneously. i.e. Enc(X) = M l XM r . Obviously, to reduce the computational cost on the local client side, the matrices should be as sparse as possible. Based on this observation, Chen et al. proposed a sparse matrix encryption method that M l and M r are sparse and row diagonally dominant matrices [11] . However, just as the paper mentioned, this efficient encryption algorithm couldn't provide strong enough privacy. Clearly, to achieve high security, M l and M r should be as dense as possible. Therefore, the key is to designing appropriate matrices to make a tradeoff between the efficiency and security.
Noting that the matrix multiplication operation is associativity, these nice properties inspire us to construct the matrices M l and M r by the product of a series of consecutive sparse matrices. Without loss of generality, we assume
, where U i , V j are sparse matrices for 1 ≤ i ≤ f (n), 1 ≤ j ≤ g(l) and f (n) (resp. g(l)) is some linear function of n (resp. l). Then the ciphertext of X can be efficiently computed by associativity
. Now, the only problem left is to generate appropriate sparse matrices U i and V j . Clearly, an ''ideal'' sparse matrix should at least satisfy the following two requirements. On one hand, it should not be too sparse. In fact, the permutation matrix is not a good choice because the product of permutation matrices is also a permutation matrix and thereby sparse. As mentioned before, it cannot protect the number of zeros in the matrix X and thus cannot provide strong security. On the other hand, the inverse of the sparse matrix should be efficiently computed. During the decryption and verification stages, we need to frequently compute the inverse of the sparse matrix.
Based on these considerations, we decide to use the unimodular matrix with order 2. Its inverse is also unimodular, which can be easily computed. This enlightens us to construct a high-dimensional sparse matrix by substituting certain diagonal elements of the identity matrix with some unimodular matrix of order 2. The form is shown in equation (3) . In summary, we encrypt the input matrices by multiplying a series of consecutive, sparse and unimodular matrices. The decryption algorithm is the inversion procedure of encryption, which is in virtue of the same transformation.
B. OUTSOURCING ALGORITHM OF MMC
Given some finite field F q with q = p k for some prime p and integer k ≥ 1 and two large-scale dense matrices X ∈ F n×l q , Y ∈ F l×m , the client C wants to compute the matrix Z = XY with the assistance of the cloud server S. Our proposed secure outsourcing algorithm SOA MMC (X, Y) consists of four subalgorithms as follows: 1) SKGen: The algorithm generates three random permutation mappings
{1, 2, · · · , m} → {1, 2, · · · , m}, and denotes their corresponding permutation matrices as P 1 ∈ {0, 1} n×n , P 2 ∈ {0, 1} l×l and P 3 ∈ {0, 1} m×m . Meanwhile, it randomly chooses (n − 1) + (l − 1) + (m − 1) unimodular matrices over F q with order 2. That is,
and
All the permutation matrices and unimodular matrices should be kept secretly by the client. 2) ClientEnc: This algorithm contains two steps. Input matrices X ∈ F n×l q and Y ∈ F l×m , Step 1 permutates the input matrices by using the secret matrices P 1 , P 2 , P 3 . Namely, it computes X = P 1 XP
where
is the matrix generated by replacing the entries located in (i, i), (i, i + 1), (i + 1, i) and (i + 1, i + 1) positions of the identity matrix I n×n with U (i) . Similarly, V j ∈ F l×l q and W k ∈ F m×m q are induced by V (j) and W (k) respectively by using the same constructions. Then the client C sends X and Y to the cloud server. 3) CloudCom: After receiving the encrypted matrices X and Y , the cloud server S computes Z = X Y , and then returns Z to C. 4) ClientDec&Ver: After receiving the Z from S, the client C first computes
, and
Then, for a given constant λ and i = 1 to λ, the client randomly generates a column vector r i ∈ {0, 1} m and computes e i = X × (Y × r i ) − Z × r i . If each vector e i = 0, the algorithm output Z. Else, the algorithm returns ⊥. To make our algorithm more transparent, we explain it with a toy instance.
Example 5: Take the finite field The proposed algorithm SOA MMC (X, Y) works as follows: (1) The client first randomly generates three permutation mappings,
with the corresponding permutation matrices and their inverses as: Moreover, the client produces 6 random 2-by-2 unimodular matrices with their inverses: Clearly, this step only confuses the local information of the entries in X (resp.Y ), which results in the exposure of statistic information of certain sensitive entries. Therefore, in order to blind the value information of each entry, the client further encrypts X and Y as follows: out of which U 1 , V 1 , V 2 , W 1 , W 2 , and W 3 are induced by U (1) , V (1) , V (2) , W (1) , W (2) , and W (3) by using the construction method shown in equation (3), respectively. That is, 
C. OUTSOURCING ALGORITHM OF MIC
For any given finite field F q with q = p k for some prime p and integer k ≥ 1, the client C wants to compute the matrix Z = X −1 for any non-singular matrix X ∈ F n×n q . Our proposed secure outsourcing algorithm SOA MIC (X) of MIC consists of the following four sub-algorithms: 1) SKGen: The algorithm generates two random permutation mappings π k : {1, 2, · · · , n} → {1, 2, · · · , n} and denotes their corresponding permutation matrices as P k ∈ {0, 1} n×n for k = 1, 2. Meanwhile, it randomly chooses 2(n − 1) unimodular matrices over F q with order 2. Let
for i, j = 1, · · · , n − 1. All the permutation matrices and unimodular matrices should be kept secretly by the client. 2) ClientEnc: Input an invertible matrix X ∈ F n×n q , this algorithm first permutates the input matrix by using the secret matrices P k for k = 1, 2. Namely, it computes X = P 1 XP 2 . And then it encrypts X by consecutive unimodular matrix transformations. Concretely, the ultimate ciphertext matrix is
where U i , and V j ∈ F n×n q are the matrices induced by U (i) and V (j) respectively by using the same constructions as shown in the equation (3) . Finally, the client C sends X to the cloud server. 3) CloudCom: After receiving the ciphertext matrix X , the cloud server S computes Z = (X ) −1 , and returns it to C. 4) ClientDec&Ver: The client C decrypts Z returned from S by computing
Then, input a certain constant λ, and for i = 1 to λ, the client randomly generates a column vector r i ∈ {0, 1} n and computes
If each vector e i = 0, the algorithm output Z. Else, the algorithm returns ⊥. Also, let's illustrate the above algorithm with a simple example.
Example 6: Take the finite field F 7 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
and suppose that X = 1 2 0 1 ∈ F 2×2 7 . Then, the proposed algorithm SOA MIC (X) goes as follows: (1) The client first generates two secret random permutation mappings
Clearly, their associated permutation matrices are
Next, the client produces another two secret random unimodular matrices
(2) Using the permutation matrices P 1 and P 2 , the client first encrypts X as
Then, the client further encrypts X by using unimodular matrix transformation and obtains the final ciphertext matrix It can be easily verified that Z = X −1 .
D. OUTSOURCING ALGORITHM OF MDC
For any dense square matrix X ∈ F n×n q , the client C intends to securely outsource the computation of det(X) to a cloud server S, where F q with q = p k for some prime p and integer k ≥ 1 is any given finite field. The proposed secure outsourcing algorithm SOA MDC (X) is as follows: 1) SKGen: The algorithm generates two random permutation mappings π k : {1, 2, · · · , n} → {1, 2, · · · , n} for k = 1, 2 and 2n random non-zero elements
Meanwhile, It randomly chooses 2(n − 1) unimodular matrices over F q with order 2.
, for i = 1, · · · , n − 1. All the permutation matrices and unimodular matrices should be kept secret by the client C. 2) ClientEnc: The client C first encrypts the matrix X by the following two steps:
where U i ,V i ∈ F n×n q are induced by U (i) , V (i) respectively by using the same construction as shown in the equation (3), and then sends X to S. 3) CloudCom: After receiving the encrypted matrices X , the cloud server S performs PLU factorization such that X = PLU, and returns P, L and U back to C. 4) ClientDec&Ver: Once receiving the matrices P, L and U, the client C first checks whether P, L and U are a permutation matrix, a lower triangular matrix and an upper triangular matrix respectively. If they do, the client C inputs a certain constant λ, and, for i = 1 to λ, randomly generates a column vector r i ∈ {0, 1} n to compute
If each vector e i = 0, the algorithm outputs
where ii (resp. u ii ) denotes the elements in the diagonal of the matrix L (resp. U). Else, the algorithm returns ⊥. Next, the client produces 4 secret 2-by-2 unimodular matrices
The client encrypts X by computing
and sends it to the cloud server. Then, it returns them back to the client. (4) The client checks the correctness of P,L and U, and decrypts the results by computing
V. CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first give strictly proofs on the correctness of the proposed algorithms, and then analyze their security according to the definitions modeled in section II-C.
A. CORRECTNESS
Informally, the correctness means that the outsourcing algorithms can make the client obtain the actual results correctly if the cloud server perform the delegated computation task honestly. The strict theoretical proof is given in the following theorem. (1) and (2) respectively, we have
Thus, in the sub-algorithm ClientDec&Ver,
and Z = P 
and Z = P 2 Z P 1 = X −1 . Consequently, for any r i ∈ {0, 1} n , e i = X × (Z × r i ) − I × r i = 0, and thereby the algorithm SOA MIC (X, Y) returns the correct result Z. 
This indicates that, (i) for any
Meanwhile,
Combining equation (6) with equation (7), we have
which is exactly the output of the sub-algorithm ClientDec&Ver. Consequently, the algorithm SOA MDC (X, Y) is correct.
B. INPUT/OUTPUT PRIVACY
In this section, we will prove that the probability that a malicious cloud server can learn the actual input and output is negligible. Formally, Theorem 2: Given some fixed finite field F q , for any valid (large-scale and dense) input matrix X ∈ F n×l q , Y ∈ F l×m q , the proposed algorithms SOA MMC (X, Y), SOA MIC (X) and SOA MDC (X) fulfill input/output privacy according to Definition 2. Proof: (1) The algorithm SOA MMC (X, Y) fulfills input/output privacy. In terms of the input privacy, we need to prove the probability that an adversary can acquire the knowledge of X and Y is negligible even if the adversary obtains the ciphertext matrices X and Y and knows the encryptions algorithm ClientEnc. In fact, by the encryption step, we know
By the key generation step, P 1 is randomly chosen from a set with size n!, P 2 is randomly chosen from a set with size l!, P 3 is randomly chosen from a set with size m!, and U i , V j , W k are randomly chosen from a set with size q(q − 1)(q + 1) (see Lemma 2) , where
Therefore, the probability that an adversary can recover X (resp. Y) is
which is a negligible function of n (resp. m).
In terms of the output privacy, we need to prove the probability that an adversary can acquire the knowledge of Z = XY is negligible even if the adversary obtains the ciphertext matrices X and Y . In order to recover Z, the adversary has two possible ways. One is to recover X and Y, and then compute Z = XY. In this way, the probability is
which obviously is a negligible function of n (resp. m). Another way is to recover Z from Z . Since
1 , and P 1 is randomly chosen from a set with size n!, P 3 is randomly chosen from a set with size m!, U i , W k are randomly chosen from a set with size q(q − 1)(q + 1) (see Lemma 2) , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 1, it is easily to deduce that, in this way, the probability is 1 (q(q − 1)(q + 1)) n+m−2 n!m! which is also a negligible function of n (resp. m).
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(2) The algorithm SOA MIC (X) fulfills input/output privacy. Similar to the analysis of algorithm SOA MMC (X, Y), we can prove the probability of an adversary can recover the input matrix X ∈ F n×n q is 1 (q(q − 1)(q + 1)) 2n−2 (n!) 2 , which is also the probability of an adversary can recover the output matrix X −1 . Obviously, it is a negligible function of n.
(3) The algorithm SOA MDC (X) fulfills input/output privacy. For any valid input (large-scale and dense) matrix X ∈ F n×n q , by the encryption algorithm ClientEnc,
Since π 1 and π 2 are randomly chosen from a set with size n!, α i and β i are randomly chosen from F q \{0 F q } for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and U i and V i are randomly chosen from a set with size q(q − 1)(q + 1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 (see Lemma 2) . It is easy to see that the probability that an adversary can recover X from X is 1 (q(q − 1)(q + 1)) 2n−2 (n!) 2 (q − 1) 2n which is obviously a negligible function of n.
Since
and det(X ) is public, the adversary can recover det (X) is by guessing the product det(P 1 ) det(P 2 ) and thereby the probability is (   1   2 ) 2 ( 1 (q−1) n ) 2 which is obviously a negligible function of n. Also, the adversary can directly guess the value of det (X) by the exhaustive attack, and therein the probability is 1 q .
C. VERIFIABILITY
Informally, we need to prove the probability that a malicious server is able to fool the client with an incorrect result is negligible. Precisely, the strict result is given as follows. Proof: We only prove the verifiability of algorithm SOA MMC (X, Y). The proofs that the algorithms SOA MIC (X) and SOA MDC (X) are 1 − 1 2 λ -verifiable are almost the same. For simplicity, we omit them.
According to Definition 3, we need to prove
Following the correctness proof in Theorem 1, we immediately obtain the equation (8). Now we analyze the inequality (9) . In the sub-algorithm ClientDec&Ver(F, Z , SK ), for any 1 
Substituting (12) into (11), we have
Therefore,
Since the verification repeats λ times, we have
VI. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we provide an elaborate theoretical and experimental analysis on the efficiency of the proposed algorithms. Definition 4. Proof: Without outsourcing, the client has to perform the MMC, MIC and MDC on its own. For any n-by-n square matrix, the most efficient known algorithm for these operations is introduced by François Le Gall with an asymptotic VOLUME 7, 2019 complexity of O(n 2.3728639 ) [26] . For general non-square input matrices arising in MMC, the client can compute the product of X ∈ F n×l q and Y ∈ F l×m q by the conventional iterative algorithm with a complexity of O (nlm) . Now, we analyze the client-side time cost in our outsourcing algorithms. In the sub-algorithm SKGen of the proposed algorithms, we need to generate random permutations and unimodular matrices. Utilizing the classic algorithm given by Durstenfeld [17] (Knuth [25] attributes the algorithm to Fisher and Yates [20] ), it only requires at most n swap operations to generate a random permutation π : {1, · · · , n} ← {1, · · · , n}. Also, the generation of 2-by-2 unimodular matrices is independent of the input matrices, and thereby they are can be efficiently preprocessed by using the well-known extended Euclidean algorithm. Therefore, the principal term of the client-side time overhead consists of the cost of subalgorithms ClientEnc and ClientDec&Ver. Let ''M'' denote the multiplication operation in the finite field F q and we omit the cost of field additions since it is negligible compared with that of field multiplications.
A. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
(1) Client-side cost of algorithm SOA MMC (X, Y).
• Cost of ClientEnc. For any valid input matrices X ∈ F n×l q and Y ∈ F l×m q , since matrix multiplication operation satisfies associative law and computing the product of a dense matrix and a sparse unimodular matrix is efficient, computing X = P 1 XP −1 2 and
needs to perform at most (4n(l − 1)+ 4l(n − 1))M and computing Y = P 2 YP −1
Hence, the total cost is O(nl + ml).
• Cost of ClientDec&Ver. Computing
needs to perform at most (4n(m − 1) + 4m(n − 1))M, and the verification process needs to perform at most (λnl)M for some given constant λ. Hence, the total cost is O(mn + nl). So, the overall time cost on the client side is O(mn + nl + ml).
(2) Client-side cost of algorithm SOA MIC (X).
• Cost of ClientEnc. For any valid input matrices X ∈ F n×n q , computing
needs to perform at most 8n(n − 1)M.
• Cost of ClientDec&Ver.
needs to perform at most 8n(n−1)M, and the verification process needs to perform at most λn 2 M for some given constant λ. Hence, the total cost is O(n 2 ). So, the overall time cost on the client side is O(n 2 ).
(3) Client-side cost of algorithm SOA MDC (X).
needs to perform at most (8n(n − 1) + 2n 2 ) M= O(n 2 )M.
• Cost of ClientDec&Ver. computing e i = P × (L × (U × r i )) − X × r i needs to perform at most n(n+1) 2 M, and thereby the verification process needs to perform at most λ n(n+1) 2 M for some given constant λ. In addition, computing
needs to perform at most 2(2n − 1)M. Hence, the total cost is O(n 2 ). So, the overall time cost on the client side is O(n 2 ). In summary, we list our analysis results in Table 1 , where t original , t client1 and t client2 denote the client's time cost of accomplishing the original matrix operation on its own, the client-side time cost of encrypting the input matrices and the client-side time cost of decrypting and verifying the returned results from the cloud, respectively, and t client = t client1 + t client2 .
B. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
Besides the theoretical analysis, we also provide the experimental evaluation on the practical performance of our proposed algorithms. Our experiments are carried out on Ubuntu machine with 2.70 GHz Intel Pentium CPU G630 and 4 GB memory. We implement the proposed algorithms in Matlab 2017a. Take the field F q = F 251 and denote t original , t client1 , t client2 and t client as the same meanings shown in the proof of Theorem 4. Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 present the experimental results on MMC, MIC and MDC respectively. Among them, all the input matrices are square and the dimension n varies from 100 to 3000, we choose l = 50 in the subalgorithm ClientDec&Ver to balance the cheating resistance and the efficiency. To visualize our experimental results, we further convert the data in tables into 2-dimensional curves. That is, FIGURE2, FIGURE 3 and FIGURE 4 compare the client-side time costs of the proposed outsourcing algorithms (t client ) with those of the corresponding algorithms without outsourcing (t original ) respectively. To highlight the slope of the curve corresponding to t client , the y-axis (vertical direction) in these figures is labeled with non-uniform scale. Finally, FIGURE 5 shows the clientside speedup (t original /t client ). It can be observed from the tables and figures that our outsourcing algorithms achieve remarkable computational savings on the client side and are more effective as the dimension n of the input matrices increasing. 
VII. COMPREHENSIVE COMPARISONS WITH PRIOR WORK
In this section, we compare our algorithms with the existing schemes introduced in Section I-A. Let R, Z denote the set of reals and the set of integers respectively, and let Z p denote the prime field that is the finite field with a prime order p. existing schemes, the third column illustrates the type of input matrices, the fourth column (t Enc ) shows the client-side time overhead in the encryption stage, the fifth column (t Dec&Ver ) shows the client-side time overhead in the decryption and verification stage, the sixth column (t Cloud ) shows the cloudside time overhead with basic algorithms for MMC, MIC and MDC in ciphertext matrices, the seventh column elucidates whether the number of zeros is protected in different schemes, the eighth column indicates the number of cloud servers in different schemes, and the last column clarifies whether the expensive homomorphic encryption operations are needed in different schemes.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we design three algorithms for outsourcing MMC, MIC and MDC to a malicious cloud. Theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation indicate that the proposed algorithms achieve a better tradeoff between the privacy and the efficiency. The main technique involving in our algorithm is a novel matrix encryption/decryption method which encrypts/decrypts a matrix by consecutive and sparse unimodular matrix transformations. A natural question is whether the similar technique can be used for outsorucing matrix operations over the field of reals R, the field of rationals Q or the ring of integers Z. Our experimental tests indicate that the answer is probably not. Since R, Q and Z are unbounded, the blow-up of the size of entries in the product matrix may be very fast, which results in the elements in the final ciphertext matrix are extremely large and thereby the similar encryption algorithm become inefficient. Another interesting problem is applying similar technique to outsource other common matrix operations, such as matrix rank computation, matrix factorization, matrix's characteristic polynomial and eigenvalues computation etc, which is left for future work.
